There is a passage in Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods that is worthy of reflection and discussion.  It is found in III.28 of the treatise, and reads as follows:

There are many who have conferred some benefit when intending to inflict harm, and many who have caused harm when trying to act rightly.  It is not from what is given that we discern the intention of the person who has given it.  And neither is it true that the giver of a gift has acted with goodwill if the beneficiary of the gift has put it to good use.  What act of lust, what impulse derived from greed, and what detestable crime, is either undertaken without conscious design, or carried through to completion without active thought and planning—that is, reason?  For every belief is reason; and it is good reason if the belief is true, but bad if the belief is false.  [III.28]

To me this quote is so laden with insight that days could be spent discussing it.  Let us consider each sentence, to discover what truths of human nature may be revealed.  I suppose no one will dispute the first sentence, an early representation of the old adage that “the road to hell is paved with good intentions.”  What is interesting here, however, is that there may be a “flip side” to this coin that is never discussed:  that is, sometimes the road to heaven is paved with evil intentions.  Human consciousness cannot know all ends; nor can it see so far into the future that it can predict the consequences of all actions.  Cicero seems to suggest that both good and evil have a place in the world, and that we ourselves are not in control.  We may think we are in control; but the outcomes of our actions are not for us to delineate with any full measure of completeness.

Let us consider the meaning of the second sentence:  it is not from what is given that we discern the intention of the person who has given it.  I should point out that in the quoted passage, Cicero is discussing the fact that the gods bestowed the gift of reason on mankind.  But even though humanity received this gift from a divine source, we cannot automatically say that the gods take special interest in human affairs.  The gift does not announce the intent of the giver.  In the same way, Cicero says, it is not true that the giver of a gift has acted with goodwill, simply because the gift’s recipient made good use of the gift. 

We should not assign benign intentions to the gods just because certain people know how to make good use of the divine gift of rational thought.  Reason itself is something of a neutral quantity, and can be put to evil use just as easily as it can be put to good use.  In fact, Cicero suggests, we often overlook the fact that every “act of lust,” “impulse derived from greed,” and “detestable crime,” has been set in motion by human reason.  The inescapable conclusion, I think, is that Cicero intends to warn us not to put too much faith in reason.  For quite often, reason follows the commands of human desire and emotion—and not the other way around.  Active thought and planning—that is, reason—are behind every base motive and nefarious crime, just as they may be behind the nobler aspirations of our nature.  It is as Blaise Pascal said, many centuries later,

A carriage upset or overturned, according to the intention.  To spread or pour, according to the intention.  [Pensées, S482/L579] 

The final sentence in Cicero’s quote above makes it clear that every human belief (opinio) is grounded in “reason.”  And if such belief happens to be true, then we may call it good reason; and if the belief happens to be wrong, then we may call it bad reason.  Cicero suggests that a divine power, even it even exists at all, is at best a neutral, uncaring presence in the universe.  The gods neither love nor detest man; they bestowed certain gifts on us for reasons that we cannot, with our lowly state of consciousness, truly fathom. 

In Cicero’s comment we glimpse here a rationalist conception of man’s place in the divine order.  It was, I think, a great intellectual achievement for Cicero to articulate the matter in this way; and in On the Nature of the Gods we have one of the first attempts at a rationalist philosophy of religion.  His views aroused the ire of both pagan philosophers, especially the Stoics, and later, some early Christian apologists, notably the theologian Lactantius.  I intend to discuss these questions in more depth in the complete translation of On the Nature of the Gods, which will be published later this summer. 

The gift of the gods we call reason is only a tool; it can be deployed for evil just as easily as it can be used for good.  And as “rational” men, we cannot take refuge in supernatural forces as a way of avoiding our own personal agency and responsibility.  For every belief, whether good or bad, we call “reason” to suit our purposes.   

.

.

.

Read more on a wide variety of moral questions in the complete, annotated translation of Cicero’s On Moral Ends:

.